Following correct procedure during patient transfer

The main reason is to reduce musculoskeletal injuries among direct caregivers.

Following correct procedure during patient transfer

Moving a patient from bed to a wheelchair URL of this page: The technique below assumes the patient can stand on at least one leg. If the patient cannot use at least one leg, you will need to use a lift to transfer the patient.

Make sure any loose rugs are out of the way to prevent slipping. You may want to put non-skid socks or shoes on the patient's feet if the patient needs to step onto a slippery surface. The following steps should be followed: Explain the steps to the patient.

Park the wheelchair next to the bed, close to you. Put the brakes on and move the footrests out of the way. Getting a Patient Ready to Transfer Before transferring into the wheelchair, the patient must be sitting. Allow the patient to sit for a few moments, in case the patient feels dizzy when first sitting up.

The following steps should be followed when getting ready to transfer a patient: To get the patient into a seated position, roll the patient onto the same side as the wheelchair. Put one of your arms under the patient's shoulders and one behind the knees.

Getting a Patient Ready to Transfer

Move the patient to the edge of the bed and lower the bed so the patient's feet are touching the ground. Pivot Turn If you have a gait belt, place it on the patient to help you get a grip during the transfer.

Stand as close as you can to the patient, reach around the chest, and lock your hands behind the patient or grab the gait belt. Place the patient's outside leg the one farthest from the wheelchair between your knees for support.

Bend your knees and keep your back straight.

Following correct procedure during patient transfer

At the same time, the patient should place their hands by their sides and help push off the bed. The patient should help support their weight on their good leg during the transfer. Pivot towards the wheelchair, moving your feet so your back is aligned with your hips.

Once the patient's legs are touching the seat of the wheelchair, bend your knees to lower the patient into the seat. At the same time, ask the patient to reach for the wheelchair armrest. If the patient starts to fall during the transfer, lower the person to the nearest flat surface, bed, chair or floor.

Assisting with positioning and transferring. American National Red Cross; Body mechanics and positioning.Patient handling, including lifting, transferring, and repositioning, is covered by SMH so they can help in the transfer. Get the patient close to the edge of bed or chair and ask them to lean forward as they stand (if medically appropriate).

Frequently shift position or stretch during long operations. implementation of policies and procedures for the transfer of patient care during approve, and establish policies and procedures for the surgery department regarding transfer of patient care during intraoperative case management per HDO protocols.

and relief CST should complete the following: 1) confirm the correct patient, patient.

Ambulate a Resident Using a Transfer Belt

Chapter - Lifting and Moving Patients (Test Questions) rename. Which of the following steps is NOT proper procedure when performing an emergency move A.) using a long-axis body drag during the move B.) pulling the patient on a blanket or similar object C.) pulling the patient’s clothing in .

General Policy and Procedure Inter-Hospital Patient Transfers The purpose of this protocol is to establish a uniform procedure for inter-hospital transfers. Patient transfer is a physician to Responsibility for the patient during transport lies with the transferring facility until the patient arrives at the receiving facility.

Following correct procedure during patient transfer

The intra- and inter-hospital patient transfer is an important aspect of patient care which is often undertaken to improve upon the existing management of the patient. It may involve transfer of patient within the same facility for any diagnostic procedure or transfer to another facility with more.

Moving a patient from bed to a wheelchair: MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia


Machu Picchu, the Andes by Lisa Kristine

Machu Picchu, the Andes

The ruins of Machu Picchu rest some 8000 feet above the Earth, the Incan Empire’s greatest architectural feat. Looming above the Cloud Forest of the Urubamba River, the lost city of the Incas boasts 200 buildings, mostly residences, temples and storage facilities.
Machu Picchu ("Old Peak") was most likely a royal estate and religious retreat. The structure was built between 1460 and 1470 AD by Pachacuti Inca Yupanqui, an Incan ruler. About 1,200 people lived in and around Machu Picchu, most of them women, children, and priests. The buildings are thought to have been planned and built under the supervision of professional Inca architects. Most of the structures are built of granite blocks cut with bronze or stone tools and smoothed with sand. The blocks fit together perfectly without mortar although they are of varying size with many faces and as many as thirty corners. The joints are so tight that even the thin knife blades can't be forced between the stones. Another unique thing about Machu Picchu is the integration of the architecture into the landscape. Existing stone formations were used in the construction of structures, sculptures are carved into the rock, water flows through cisterns and stone channels, and temples hang on steep precipices.
The Spanish invaders at the time of the conquest and during centuries of colonial rule never discovered the city and nobody ever led them there; this suggests a site long abandoned and forgotten. However, Machu Picchu had never been lost to those who lived around it and those people eventually led the American explorer Hiram Bingham and his team to the site in 1911. Hiram Bingham, now world-famous as the discoverer of Machu Picchu, did not initially travel to South America to explore the land of the Incas. In fact, the Hawaiian-born Yale and Harvard educated historian first journeyed south from the United States to complete his study of the great nineteenth century liberator Simon Bolivar.
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An Act of Love

When it is revealed that Sethe killed her own child in order to keep all of her children from entering slavery, the reader has mixed emotions on how to feel. After all, she did murder her own baby, how could a person do that. But Sethe’s act, as horrid and appalling as it was, was one out of love. She loved her children so much, she could not bare to see them in the grasp of slavery in their lifetime.

Under the institution of slavery, Sethe as a mother decides to express her love for her children by in her own way, protecting them from the many destructive aspects that come from slavery. If we look through Sethe’s eyes and into her situation, would we do the same? Because of her act, Denver and her 2 brothers grew up free. Was the price of one child worth the three lives it saved?

By making us consider this, Morrison is finding ways to make the reader really place themselves in Beloved and the necessities that were felt back then. As an African American woman in 2019, I could not fathom having to make a choice like Sethe. Although her choice was one that will forever haunt her dreams, Sethe’s bravery to even consider something like that in order to save her children is what I admire.

Saeed’s Perspective on American Nativeness in Exit West and the Current World

Existentialism in Groundhog Day

All throughout Camus’ book, The Stranger, the main character Meursault has an outlook on life that stuns everyone he comes across, whether it be his girlfriend Marie or his lawyer when he is in prison. Despite how society views Meursault as a person, he refuses to change any of his beliefs, even when it ultimately leads to his death.

After reading the stranger, I began thinking of whether I have seen any examples of this kind of existentialism in other works. I was reminded of the movie Groundhog Day, where the main character, Phil Connors, is forced to repeat the same day over in a town that he mocks for celebrating Groundhog Day. Eventually after a while, Phil views time as a pointless construct that is just a repeated thing, day, and idea.

Further into the movie, Phil goes on to develop an existentialist point of view that is very similar to Meursault’s. He feels as if life itself is just repetitive, so as an individual he can do what he thinks. By the end of this movie though, Phil escapes the loop and finds love in a woman named Rita. This shift in the movie is what specifically contrasts with Meursault’s views on love and life. In The Stranger, Meursault simply just does not believe in loving Marie because it did not mean anything.

Although Phil Connors and Meursault have similar views at one point, they both end their stories going in two different directions, one being finding love through others and the other being that things like love and death are essentially meaningless.


Test-ing times, but remedies are at hand

Hindustan Times

Hindustan Times

Author 2019-10-25 11:04:34

To give Test cricket in India a fillip, Virat Kohli says there should be no more than five centres in the country. This has already invited criticism from the cricket administration. However, to go strictly by the numeric value of the Indian captain’s statement is to miss the woods for the trees.

As I read it, Kohi essentially wants to highlight the primacy of the five-day format. This is badly needed globally if Test cricket is not to be blown away by the T20 razzmatazz, and is particularly relevant in India at this point in time.

While Indian cricket—particularly in the five-day format—is at its zenith, spectator attendance has hit a nadir. Consider that just around 50,000 people (give or take a few thousand) attended the three recent Tests against South Africa, and the seriousness of the problem is evident.

The best Test team in the world is in action. It also happens to be the home team. But Indian fans have remained unimpressed. This is more a tragedy than conundrum and demands the urgent attention and assistance of administrators and players.

People of my vintage will recall the days when 50,000 people would attend a single day’s play in some parts of the country. In the 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s, Test matches in India would be jam-packed, even when second-string teams came touring here.

Clear signals

However, Test cricket languishes now. There were clear signals from the mid-1990s that spectatorship was not as intense as it used to be even a decade earlier, and would slump further unless some remedial steps were taken.

The idea of taking Test matches away from traditional centres to smaller cities and associations was to ensure that the popularity of the longest format would remain intact, if not grow. But if the decline has not been arrested, then something’s remiss.

This is not to suggest that India is the only country where Test cricket is struggling to find fans to fill stadia. The problem’s worldwide. If anything, it’s worse in most countries barring England and Australia.

India’s role in stemming the decline becomes paramount because it has the largest number of cricket followers — and the dosh — to do this. What’s been lacking so far is the imagination and conviction to be in the vanguard in this effort.

The administration has been happy to find succour in data that suggests the following for Test cricket in India has grown. This may well be true in terms of media consumption of the sport. But if it does not find expression in spectatorship, then sport is soulless.

So what can be done?

In the Indian context the problem has to be tackled on two fronts. Firstly, by positioning Test cricket differently and emphatically as something to be savoured. The Ashes is a great example of how a sporting legacy can be established, sustained and monetised over unending period of time.

Equally importantly, the spectator experience has to be made fantastically worthwhile. Nobody will spend good money, and suffer for five days with poor facilities (for food, toilet, parking etc.) on a repeat basis when there are so many options for entertainment available.

There can be other considerations too to popularise Test cricket. Sachin Tendulkar, for instance had mooted free admission for school kids in the last session, which is a splendid idea to initiate the young into the five-day format. Unless they acquire the ‘taste’ early enough, how will they build loyalty?

At the global level, the World Test Championship is a step in the right direction as is day-night cricket. India has ridiculously spurned the latter so far, which will hopefully change now that new BCCI president Sourav Ganguly has spoken in its favour.

The biggest influencers in my opinion, however, are still the players.

Particularly relevant today when so many are giving up on the five-day format for easier opportunities and lucre in T20 leagues and such.

This is where Kohli becomes so important in the current game.

Even as he rides the T20 wave with great success, he’s been pitching even more strongly for Test cricket, leaving no one in doubt which format he finds the most challenging and rewarding.

It is moot if the world’s biggest player making his preference known so emphatically can help salvage Test cricket. But at least it creates a favourable sentiment which provides some kind of hope.

(Writer is veteran sports journalist. Views are personal)

Experience triple speed

Never miss the exciting moment of the game


Eighty-Eight Years

Title Details

Pages: 416

Trim size: 6.000in x 9.000in

Pub Date: 08/15/2015

ISBN: 9-780-8203-4839-1

List Price: $32.95

Pub Date: 08/15/2015

ISBN: 9-780-8203-3395-3

List Price: $89.95

Pub Date: 08/15/2015

ISBN: 9-780-8203-4829-2

List Price: $32.95

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Published with the generous support of Sarah Mills Hodge Fund

Eighty-Eight Years

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  • Description
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  • Awards

Why did it take so long to end slavery in the United States, and what did it mean that the nation existed eighty-eight years as a "house divided against itself," as Abraham Lincoln put it? The decline of slavery throughout the Atlantic world was a protracted affair, says Patrick Rael, but no other nation endured anything like the United States. Here the process took from 1777, when Vermont wrote slavery out of its state constitution, to 1865, when the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery nationwide.

Rael immerses readers in the mix of social, geographic, economic, and political factors that shaped this unique American experience. He not only takes a far longer view of slavery's demise than do those who date it to the rise of abolitionism in 1831, he also places it in a broader Atlantic context. We see how slavery ended variously by consent or force across time and place and how views on slavery evolved differently between the centers of European power and their colonial peripheries-some of which would become power centers themselves.

Rael shows how African Americans played the central role in ending slavery in the United States. Fueled by new Revolutionary ideals of self-rule and universal equality-and on their own or alongside abolitionists-both slaves and free blacks slowly turned American opinion against the slave interests in the South. Secession followed, and then began the national bloodbath that would demand slavery's complete destruction.

—Kirkus Reviews (starred review)

In this meticulously researched study . . . Rael adds detail and nuance to a story with which readers might have believed themselves already well acquainted.

—Publishers Weekly

This important and vigorously argued study of the process of emancipation in the US, a process that began with Vermont's abolition of slavery in 1777 and culminated with the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865-eighty-eight years-examines American abolition and emancipation over time, broadening the perspective on a story that usually begins with the rise of radical abolitionists in the early 1830s. With its wider chronological lens and hemispheric context, Rael's book is a must-read study of slavery and its end in the US.

—K. M. Gannon, Choice

While many historians have built upon the work of Leonard Richards in describing the slave power's domination of US politics in the antebellum era, none have explained it as thoroughly as Patrick Rae! has in his synthetic, yet path-breaking, work on antislavery in the Atlantic. . . . His goal is to explain why it took eighty-eight years and a civil war to end slavery in the United States, and he achieves this through tight, yet thorough, analysis and the elegant, yet clear, prose his works are known for.

—Beverly Tomek, American Book Review

Other historians have increasingly made connections between slavery in the Atlantic and the United States, though Rael does much more than make connections-he succeeds at showing the strong similarities between Atlantic slaveholding societies, while at the same time explaining why this United States retained a strong interest in slavery longer than almost anywhere else.

—James J. Gigantino II, Arkansas Historical Quarterly

[A]n impressive achievement. . . . An ambitious synthetic work such as this is inevitably open to various qualms, protests, and quibbles. Among this work's multiple strengths is that it invites and rewards such critical engagement.

—Matthew Mason, Journal of American History

In terms of its chronological and geographic scope, Eighty-Eight Years' rivals are few and distinguished. . . . Eighty-Eight Years will prove of great value to scholars in the field of slavery and abolition, as well as those looking to catch up on trends in the field.

—John Craig Hammond, Reviews in History

Harriet Tubman Book Prize, Lapidus Center

Best Books of the Year, Kirkus Reviews

Outstanding Academic Title, Choice magazine

About the Author/Editor

PATRICK RAEL is a professor of history at Bowdoin College and one of the general editors of the Race in the Atlantic World, 1700-1900 series. His books include Black Identity and Black Protest in the Antebellum North and African-American Activism before the Civil War: The Freedom Struggle in the Antebellum North. Rael is an Organization of American Historians distinguished lecturer, 2010-2015.


Thank you for your patience.

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Editor’s Note: Issue 7.5

There is a structural problem when a sport neglects the responsibilities of its fundamentals.

AS YOU RECEIVE THIS ISSUE, Olympians Mike Gebhardt and Lanee Butler will be competing in Sydney, Australia, September 16th to the 24th. While the competition heats up, a movement to replace the current Mistral IMCO with the Formula Class racing program is taking place.

Formula Class is a new concept of racing that has been growing in popularity, especially in Europe, within the past two years. It is supported by the industry and pretty much by all those who represent what windsurfing is today. The concept is fast, fun, and simple. Pick one board and three sails and that is the Formula equipment you will use for the event.

The idea sounds good and it is far more representative of what modern windsurfing is: performance and early planing, with a restriction on the equipment syndrome. It is indeed a positive step for the future of racing. Even the Professional Windsurfing Association (PWA) sees the Formula as a platform for future World Cup racing. The PWA in recent days has been the biggest lobbyist to get the Formula Class adopted by the International Regulations Committee of the International Sailing Federation (ISF), which was formerly the IYRU.

Even Bjorn Dunkerbeck maintains that if Formula racing gets into the Olympics, he will retire from the World Cup and focus on Formula racing. The long-time champion would be a pretty big carrot for the class and clearly, a new racing formula destined for success.

But the issue for the ISF is more complicated than it appears and the status of windsurfing in the Olympics is far more consequential than you might think. There is a small group of concerned people, and I would place myself amongst them, who argue that if windsurfing wants to find a quick way out of the Olympics, then the Formula Class is a perfect exit formula.

One has to consider the fact that the International Olympic Committee, (IOC) is pressed to cut back on the number of recognized sports. Already, they’ve managed to cut back on the number of countries by allowing only the top thirty-six competitors who qualify.

Currently, windsurfing is one of the eleven yachting events recognized by the IOC. While the Formula Class might be more representative of what windsurfing is today, imposing the class to replace the Mistral IMCO will take it out of the protective brotherhood of the powerful yachting association and place it alone in a vulnerable position. Don’t think for a minute that the IOC is not prone to pick on the weak!

The issue at hand is performance. The current Mistral IMCO is not the fastest or the sexiest, but it is a sailable platform for winds between zero and thirty knots. It is a tactical light to medium wind machine that can plane into a performance mode or fall into a sub-planing, yachting experience. It is the only class that can bridge the world of windsurfing with that of yachting. And that is what we need to keep it alive in the Olympics.

The Formula Class only performs in wind ranges higher than six knots. It does not have a centerboard and when underpowered, it has no tactical maneuverability. To gain performance in low winds, it is a high-cost, high-tech game. Even though gear restrictions are in place, compared to the IMCO, it is considerably more expensive.

One could predict a 100% probability that there will be an Olympics when winds do not rise above six knots. There have been plenty of world-class events in the past during which the winds did not support competition. During the Olympic event in Atlanta, sixty percent of the races were held in winds below six knots. So how many times can we expect the IOC to understand the unique demands of windsurfing? The answer might be, zero.

The day will come when yachting will be asked to reduce the number of classes. The IMCO or a similar product could stand favorably if it upheld the following advantages: 1) affordability, 2) excellent global participation for the average man, and 3) a strict one-design and simple race management.

I took a prototype board similar to the IMCO out yesterday in winds of zero to six knots. To my surprise, three hours went by as I found great pleasure in playing with the cat-paw winds. Access to this wind range is a part of windsurfing we’ve all forgotten. If more and more people can find such activity, this sport will grow once again. Unfortunately, the Olympics offer the last arena where competitive windsurfing exists in such a wind range. For the sake of the future, it should be preserved as a form of yachting, no matter how distant the sport has moved from the roots.

There is a structural problem when a sport neglects the responsibilities of its fundamentals. Windsurfing has suffered such neglect. It has become an elitist toy for those blessed by an abundant wind. The desire to replace the IMCO with the Formula Class arises from a hangover caused by the intoxication of excessive wind.

Let’s hope the hangover will pass soon.

John Chao

For more comments turn to A New Formula or Status Quo? by Bruce Kendall

by John Chao

Publisher / Editor of American Windsurfer is a former photojournalist for GEO, National Geographic and Time-Life Magazines.


Geospatial – News

OpenLayers 3: geolocation with map orientation

2 Mai 2014

With the wide availability of Web technologies, more and more GIS applications are available online and accessible from mobile terminals. New use-cases are attributed to this mobility. Users expect to geolocate their position on a map as well as to use the map application for routing/navigation purposes.

  •     geolocation
  •     navigation
  •     animation
  •     HTML5 Geolocation API
  •     OpenLayers 3

Geolocation requires to recenter the map on the user’s position and highlight this position with a marker. In a routing context, the map will pan in order to keep the position of the user at the center of the map. Besides, the map will turn so that the top of the map is always the direction the users is going towards, simplifying the map interpretation and the user orientation.

Geolocation/navigation in a nomad context is not easy, since routing implies frequent position changes as well as variations of the geolocation precision. Even though the HTML5 APIs provide raw position and direction information, their use as such is not sufficient since there is position or orientation skipping resulting in jerkily moves on the map.

Smooth user position and direction need to be implemented on the basis of the information provided by the HTML5 geolocation API.

To reach this goal, the raw information provided by the geolocation API is temporarily stored in a vector suite allowing to interpolate and to smooth out information before its transfer to the map.

Technically, we processed as follows:

When a new position is provided by the geolocation API, a new point is added to a LineString XYZM-type geometry. This 4D geometry allows to store different positions when moving. The Z coordinate is actually used to store the orientation and M, the time. Thanks to suite of points, the X, Y and Z values can be interpolated for all M time, relying on the “getCoordinateAtM” method provided by OpenLayers 3.

To animate the map as smoothly as possible, we use the animation framework of OpenLayers 3. For each frame, via the function „beforeRender“, we change the center and rotation values of the frame state. In this way, it is guaranteed that we do get with a millisecond precision the interpolated value corresponding to the current frame, regardless of the refresh frequency rate (which depends on the browser performances), at the instant t. (cf.

Particular attention has been paid to the management of map rotation angles. Angle rotation changes over 180° must be avoided so not to make the user dizzy. For instance, when the direction goes from 20° to 350°, a 30° counterclockwise rotation must be made and not a 330° clockwise rotation.

Thanks to the internal mechanism of animation management, a fluid animation throughout the user moves leads to optimal user comfort.

You can directly test the example if you have a smart phone.

You can also test the application by simulating a move from a sample of real data.

  •     live example

To improve even more this example, we could for instance represent the precision factor (accuracy) of the geolocation as a circle around the user position.

We could also adjust the resolution of the view based on speed. The precision would then be greater at a slow speed, and smaller at a greater speed.

Finally, we could position the map on the basis of information provided by the compass when the speed is 0 rather than repositioning the map with the North pointing up.


+1 917 993 96 90

For installation of the Grid of Gunn you should select the insertion menu item - "Gunn" - "Gunn's Grid"

Gunn's grid completely consists of Gunn's Lines.

Gunn's line is one more type of trend lines - the most frequent tools for the analysis of a trend in the market Forex. It represents the line drawn at an angle in 45 degrees. This line is also called "one to one" that means one change in price to a unit of time.

As it was already said, Gunn's lines always represent powerful lines of support

or resistance

and intersection of each item can create powerful impulse for further movement.

We will study the picture. It is visible that when the prices are over the rising line, it means that the market adheres to the bull direction.

When the prices are under the falling line it means that the market adheres to the bear direction

Сетка Ганна является мощным инструментом, но ее не рекомендуется использовать начинающим трейдерам , так как при неправильной установке она будет давать неправильные сигналы на покупку или продажу.


On the fast train from Brussels to Paris a few years ago, I met a young woman from the Philippines who was taking a weekend holiday from her job in Belgium to visit France for the first time. As the train entered the outskirts of Paris, she turned to me and said in surprise, “I didn’t realize the French were a black people.” It was my turn to be surprised, until I looked out the window and saw that we were in the banlieues, the segregated neighborhoods consisting largely of West and North African “immigrants” that ring the city. I put “immigrants” in scare quotes because many of these people are long-term residents of France; indeed, many of them are citizens. The word is nonetheless regularly used in France to distinguish them from the Français de souche—the legitimate (white) members of the nation.

“Immigrant” has become a kind of epithet these days, and not only in France. Everywhere in Europe, and also in the United States, immigrants are blamed for all manner of problems: crime, unemployment, disease, the deterioration of public services, the exhaustion of public funds, threats to liberal culture and mores. Right-wing populist politicians in nearly every country of the Western Hemisphere appeal to voters with plans to cleanse the national body of these impure invaders, to expel them, to build walls to keep them out. References to a “crisis” of immigration have become a convenient way to talk about many other things as well: race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and, especially, the human costs wrought by global capitalism and the growing inequalities it has engendered within and across the nations of the world.

These references to an “immigrant crisis” antedate the arrival of waves of refugees fleeing war and violence in Africa and the Middle East; the recent refugees have only heightened the discourse. Three new books attempt to see beyond the contours of the current crisis and to tap into a deeper set of economic, political, and cultural anxieties. Rita Chin’s The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe offers a comparative history of the ways in which politicians in several Western European nations have dealt with growing numbers of non-Western immigrants from the 1950s to the present. Sara R. Farris’s In the Name of Women’s Rights examines the unlikely convergence in recent years among right-wing nationalist political parties, neoliberals, and certain feminists around the question of “emancipation” and non-Western—particularly Muslim—women in France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Rafia Zakaria’s Veil shifts the balance away from white secular Europe toward the experience of Muslim women, mapping the stereotypical representations of the veil in Western culture and then reflecting, in an intensely personal way, on the many meanings that the veil can have for the people who wear it.

Despite their differences, these three books illuminate how Western liberal democracies, since the 1950s, have struggled to develop strategies to manage diversity in societies once considered homogeneous—secular, white, and Christian. Although some of the nations of the West were long used to assimilating other Europeans, the arrival of former colonial subjects was a different matter. Viewed through the racist lens that had justified imperial conquest, these brown, mostly Muslim people were seen not only as different but as inferior. Their difference was also seen as a threat to European national identity. It was one thing to tolerate their presence as a temporary solution to shortages of labor; it was quite another to consider them and their families as permanent residents with the equal rights of fellow citizens.

In her well-researched volume, Rita Chin, a professor of history at the University of Michigan, provides detailed information about the different policies developed in the countries she studied: France, Germany, Britain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. By comparing them, she highlights not only their different policies but also their overarching similarities: Cultural racism is the underlying stance taken in the face of increasingly diverse ethnic and religious populations.

Chin calls this diversity “multiculturalism,” a term that—despite a whole chapter devoted to its various definitions—remains confusing in her various usages. It is Chin’s word for describing an objective reality and for invoking the policies that developed in response to this reality. It is also an epithet employed by European politicians in the 1990s to distinguish their policies from the reviled American ones, which viewed multiculturalism as a positive respect for ethnic and racial differences. By using the same word to denote the nature of diverse populations and the discourses about them, Chin’s study loses a certain analytic acuity. Still, it offers a rich historical account of the continuities and changes in immigration policy in the countries she studied.

Chin’s account begins with labor recruitment. She notes that guest-worker programs took off after World War II and flourished in the expanding economies of the 1960s. When European laborers were scarce, men were recruited from the former colonies: “The twin concerns of empire and labor…drove the emergence of multicultural societies.” For these newcomers to Europe, programs were set up by their hosts that encouraged expressions of religious and cultural difference as a way of maintaining the workers’ attachments to their countries of origin and in the expectation that when the jobs were done, they would return home. For example, religious leaders were imported from these workers’ home countries. The policies had little to do with multiculturalism, in the sense of positively recognizing the plural nature of European nations. In fact, it was quite the opposite: They sought to ensure the disposable and replaceable nature of the migrant labor force as a “reserve industrial army.”

When guest workers were no longer needed during the economic downturn of the 1970s, Western European leaders moved to close their nations’ borders and end the recruitment of foreign labor. But they were faced with a dilemma they couldn’t easily resolve: These workers had been bringing their families in the preceding decades with an eye to settling on European soil, and they had been living in Europe in communities that had been encouraged through various state-sponsored programs to express their religious and cultural differences. Now Western European countries had to come to terms with their own labor and cultural policies, having inadvertently brought the empire home. “The nearly twenty-five year scramble to procure foreign workers,” Chin writes, “had resulted in the permanent settlement of transient labor that was increasingly nonwhite, non-Christian and non-
European.… Communities of different ethnicities, cultures, and religions increasingly lived side by side with the British, French, Dutch and Germans, spawning multicultural societies throughout Western Europe.”

An aspect of this story that Chin doesn’t emphasize enough is the vast economic problem posed by the presence of these now unemployed or underemployed surplus laborers and their families, who found themselves doubly disadvantaged by their cultural difference. But she does describe in detail the various strategies that national leaders developed to deal with the presence of these guests who had now overstayed their welcome. The strategies included policies that promoted views of ethnic and racial groups as separate, balkanized identities and euphemisms about improving “race relations” that denied the structures of discrimination that poisoned them.

These strategies also included calls for assimilation and integration that placed the burden of religious and cultural accommodation on the migrants themselves. For the most part, Western European countries did not want to acknowledge “how radically their societies had changed,” and many politicians sought to depoliticize a situation that would soon explode, despite their best efforts, into furious debates about race, immigration, and national identity in the late 1980s and 1990s.

For many countries in Western Europe, 1989 seems to have been a turning point: the moment when a series of developments focused new attention on immigrants, especially Muslims. In France, the celebration of the bicentennial of the French Revolution coincided with an important electoral victory for Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front (attributed to the success of his anti-immigrant campaigns) and the first of the affaires du foulard (the attempt to prohibit girls wearing Muslim head scarves from attending public schools). The Berlin Wall also came down in the fall of that year, opening up discussions on the meaning of democracy (free markets and sexual liberation included), as well as a flood of cheap immigrant labor from Eastern and Central Europe. These new immigrant workers were considered a problem, but nowhere near as much as Muslims, especially after the Ayatollah Khomeini issued his fatwa against the novelist Salman Rushdie, creating an international cause célèbre and hardening many liberal Europeans’ views on the subject of Islam.

Chin points out that the fatwa was particularly decisive for many Europeans who were already worrying about the growing number of Muslim immigrants and citizens within their countries. “For many Western Europeans,” she writes, “this was the moment when Muslim immigrants with diverse national origins merged into a single, distinctive category. This was also the moment when Islam was first identified as unbending, an intolerant religion that explained Muslim immigrants’ failure to properly integrate…. [T]his was the pivotal juncture when Islam itself came to be seen as a central threat to ‘liberal values’…across all the major Western European powers.”

As many celebrated the victory of liberal democracy over communism, commentators also began to point to the “failure” of multiculturalism and its policies of recognition and appreciation of diversity. But what they meant by “failure” was not that the policies failed to create more welcoming societies, but rather that Muslim culture simply wasn’t compatible with the national traditions of European countries. Throughout Europe, “their” culture was defined as antagonistic to “ours.” In what some critical scholars came to call “the new racism,” culture became a byword—and not only among the European right. As Chin notes, it had “supplanted biology as the key marker of incommensurable difference.”

Chin cites comments by Margaret Thatcher in 1978 as an example of what she characterizes as this new wave of “cultural nationalism.” Reacting to a report that projected the arrival of millions of people from Pakistan in the United Kingdom by the end of the century, Thatcher observed: “Now, that is an awful lot and I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture. The British character has done so much for democracy, for law and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in.”

This increasingly politicized fear of European culture being “swamped” soon became a “clash of civilizations,” a term coined by the Islamic scholar Bernard Lewis in 1990 and then popularized in a 1993 article by the political scientist Samuel Huntington. The term deliberately evoked the religious wars of the medieval period in order to rally the forces of contemporary Western Christian secularism in a crusade against the Muslim enemy. To disarm this foe, the states of Western Europe enacted laws and regulations that ranged from criminalizing certain individual displays of religious affiliation to limiting the height of the minarets on mosques. In their attempts at containment (euphemistically referred to as “integration”), these European nations tightened the eligibility requirements for entry and naturalization, as well as proposed tests of cultural literacy and linguistic mastery for migrants from Muslim and other non-Western countries. In effect, as the sociologist Sara Farris points out, immigrants were expected to possess knowledge of their new country “before the actual contact with [it] begins.”

Farris’s In the Name of Women’s Rights is more theoretical in its approach, offering a supplement to Chin’s historical narrative that focuses on the specific question of non-Western women migrants, most of whom are Muslim. Whereas Chin offers one chapter on women and gender, Ferris devotes her entire book to that subject.

Beginning in the 1970s and ’80s, Farris argues, non-Western immigrant women “became the object of political scrutiny and stereotyping. Typical orientalist gendered dichotomies began to be applied to them: if migrant males were usually depicted as brutes and uncivilized, women were portrayed as passive and submissive.” By contrast, Western European women were deemed autonomous and empowered by, among other things, laws that now permitted divorce and abortion and addressed discrimination in education and the professions, as well as cultural practices defined as “sexual democracy” or “sexual liberation.”

Many of these new feminists and nationalists turned their attention to the veils worn by Muslim women, arguing that they were the very symbol of the immigrants’ purported backwardness, the sign of an intolerable gender inequality alien to the West. The push to rescue Muslim women, Farris argues, was the result of what she terms the “ideological convergence” of calls for gender equality with xenophobic anti-immigrant campaigns—the “femonationalism” mentioned in the subtitle of her book. Femonationalism, she explains, “describes, on the one hand, the attempts of Western European right-wing parties and neoliberals to advance xenophobic and racist politics through the touting of gender equality while, on the other hand, it captures the involvement of various well-known and quite visible feminists and femocrats in the current framing of Islam as a quintessentially misogynistic religion and culture.”

Farris argues that the political anxiety about Muslims in general took the form of advocacy for the emancipation of Muslim women in particular because of “a specifically economic logic”: Whereas Muslim and other non-Western migrant men were viewed as a “reserve army of labor”—that is, a supplemental labor force to be employed only when needed—their female counterparts, working in the domestic-service and care industries, were seen as a part of the “regular army of labor,” constituting an indispensable, irreplaceable labor force that could not otherwise be found. This labor force was needed, Farris notes, to secure the social reproduction of the population itself.

The importance of this migrant female labor force to the social and economic well-being of Western nations was evident in the state policies of the countries that Farris studied: France, Italy, and the Netherlands. These countries provided a variety of subsidies to families for domestic service and elder and child care, sometimes in the form of cash payments, sometimes as tax credits. In this way, they at once commodified and privatized social services, for which Muslim and non-Western migrant women provided “the lion’s share of supply.” This work was defined by government agencies as necessary and vital; it was also considered a permanent feature of the job markets of these countries, a way of helping Muslim women to integrate socially and culturally.

Since they did not compete with native women workers, and as a result of what Farris notes were the “neoliberal reforms in welfare regimes in the direction of the so-called commodification of care [and]…the feminization and racialization of specific labor markets,” migrant women workers were critical to the economy, and so they became defined not as a liability but as victims to be saved. Nationalists turned to the language of secular feminism in order to criticize the way in which these women were oppressed by their cultural and religious norms—as embodied by their veils. Likewise, many European feminists insisted that it was precisely “care” work that would “save” Muslim women by providing them with wage-earning labor that was inherently emancipatory.

There is an irony in this, as Farris observes. The European feminists’ insistence that migrant women’s autonomy would be furthered by the work of domestic service defined as liberating the very household drudgery that these feminists had long sought to escape. There is both a racist and a sexist element to this, Farris says, because “they reinforce the conditions for the reproduction at the societal level of Muslim and non-Western migrant women’s segregation, traditional gender roles, and the gender injustice they claim to be combating.”

Veil, the highly personal meditation by Rafia Zakaria, a journalist and philosopher of Pakistani origin, provides a voice from the other side of the story recounted by Chin and Farris—a voice that is rarely listened to by the politicians and feminists who associate unveiling with the liberation of Muslim women.

In a series of chapters that reflect on her own personal experience (wearing a full-face veil at her traditional Muslim wedding in Karachi; watching her grandmother drape a veil around her face when men got too close to her in the market; observing women at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London), Zakaria explores the many meanings of the veil as it is worn and observed. Each chapter has a different theme, among them submission, purity, rebellion, feminism, and subversion. Zakaria’s style is associative, not linear; no single line of argument is developed. The aim is to appeal to personal experience as a way of establishing authority for her assertions, and also as a way of evoking sympathy in the reader (who is presumed to be Western).

Veils, Zakaria argues, offer a range of subjective and objective meanings that depend on the “particularities of person and politics and context.” Indeed, one of the many meanings of this piece of cloth is that it can be a form of empowerment for the women who choose to wear it. “Independent of context, it does not have much meaning,” but in specific settings (within and outside the Muslim community), the veil can have many positive ones: as a sign of submission to one’s faith, or an individual’s purity, or her desire for collective, communal identification. It can also, Zakaria argues, give a certain sense of pleasurable power: that of seeing without being seen. Its wearing can sometimes signal rebellion—a challenge to the Western European “aesthetics of the public sphere”—and even a certain strain of feminism, allowing women to express their individual autonomy.

Zakaria’s approach also differs from Farris’s and Chin’s in its scope. Chin has a chapter on how veiled women became, in the 1990s, evidence of Islam’s cultural incompatibility with the West, and Farris, expanding on this, examines how, for European nationalists and feminists, the veil became a symbol of how Islam denies Western liberalism’s ideal of sexual democracy. Zakaria’s explanation is at once narrower and more directed to the present. She is less interested in the deep historical roots of the immigrant question; instead, she frames her argument within the context of the so-called War on Terror that began in the early 2000s. This draws her readers’ attention to the present political implications of the veil. “The fully veiled Muslim woman,” Zakaria explains, “once imagined as singularly exotic and repressed, an emblem of the harem of old, ripe with forbidden sexual possibility, did not fit into [the] rhetoric of the War on Terror. That War could no longer be based simply on the demonization of the Muslim man; it required an extension of suspicion to the Muslim woman, particularly the Muslim woman who was not willing to do away with the veil.”

If Chin offers us history and Farris sociological theory, Zakaria’s more personal, philosophical approach is intended to contest the singular meaning that the veil has acquired in much of the West. By exploring the subjective experiences of the veil, we begin to see how both wearing it and not wearing it have profound psychic resonances for those who make these choices, as well as for those who regard it with hostility or even just curiosity. In one notable example, Zakaria writes of the desire of white women in the days of empire to unveil “other” colonized women, a desire that established their superiority as representatives of a higher civilization. Or, referring to the work of the Iranian-American artist Shirin Neshat, Zakaria notes the startling message conveyed in a photograph of a fully veiled woman pointing a gun at the viewer: “A veil is revealed then to be not just fabric but a partition and a boundary…. To put the veil back on, to retreat into feminine space, is a wish for reclamation.”

These psychic resonances of the veil—“desire,” “wish”—deserve more attention in analyses of Islamophobia in general and of the place of veiled women within it in particular. But the representation of Muslim women as sexually repressed is key to understanding these resonances, and it is underexamined by all of these authors, including Zakaria. In the course of the 21st century, sexual liberation (the individual’s ability to sleep with whomever she chooses) has come to be equated with gender equality and with freedom more generally, eclipsing all of the other measures of equality that might be used. A certain form of sexual desire (that experienced by the autonomous individual of liberal political theory) is presented as universal and natural, not as a culturally produced artifact of the West. This view of things elicits a visceral repugnance to the alleged perversions of Islam: “We” project our experience of thwarted desire onto “them.”

As a result, the stark contrast between Islam and the West on the question of sexual liberation confirms the West’s sense of its own superiority in the matter of gender equality, even as it conceals the vast discrepancies in wealth and status. In this way, the binary that many liberals, feminists, and nationalists invoke—sexual freedom versus sexual repression—translates discrimination (based on economics, race, class, or religion) into a moral virtue that quarantines the bad influences these immigrants bring with them. It is not the poverty or exclusion they experience in our societies that defines “those people” as unacceptable, but rather their retrograde beliefs and behaviors, especially around issues of sex. At the same time, the belief that “our” system of gender relations is universal and natural while “theirs” is perverse soothes the anxieties and uncertainties that haunt the relations between the sexes on “our” side.

In France, as I have suggested elsewhere, the veiled woman is perceived as deeply disquieting because her veil suggests that sexuality presents a problem for social relationships that must be addressed by declaring sex off-limits in public space. This is a challenge for a republican political system that, on the one hand, promises equality for all and, on the other, has historically excluded or subordinated women because of the difference of their sex—a difference that has to be openly displayed as justification for their different treatment. If gender equality is defined only as sexual emancipation, then all of the other inequalities faced by women in France—political, social, and economic—are made to disappear, and existing gender norms are held firmly in place. The fantasy of freedom is sustained by comparing uncovered French women with those Muslim women covered by the veil. Although political cultures vary in the countries of Western Europe, something similar operates in all of them.

There is clearly a crisis of immigration in Europe. It is evident in the deadlock between an increasing insistence by politicians on the homogeneity of cultural nationalism, on the one hand, and the presence of diverse populations within national borders, on the other. It has only intensified in the wake of the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the war-torn and economically devastated countries of the Global South. We are at a turning point (one of the meanings, after all, of the word “crisis”): Will those “black people” that we glimpsed from the train, and who are sequestered in the banlieues, ever be accepted as fully French? Will the day come when I would react not in surprise but in affirmation to that young woman (“Yes, some French are black”)? And what of Western feminism? Is there a path away from the binaries of “West/East” and “sexually liberated/sexually repressed” that might yield a more genuinely inclusive vision of what emancipation and gender equality could mean?

A glimmer of what might be possible on this last question came from a collective of women in France—Muslim and non-Muslim, religious and secular—that was formed during the debates over the head-scarf law in 2003–4. These women declared that they were opposed to all forms of domination, whether patriarchal, capitalist, or state-imposed: no forced wearing of the veil, no forced removal of the veil. By focusing on domination as the common denominator, the women found a way out of all those other politically and culturally divisive binaries—not by denying their power, but rather by offering a way to place them in their proper context.

On the subject of refugees and the masses of migrants pouring into European cities from Africa and the Middle East, these authors offer different perspectives. Chin suggests that, on the ground, there is more genuine integration than the politicians would care to admit, and that this provides hope for the future of multiculturalism. Zakaria offers her book as an “object lesson” (the name of the series to which it belongs) on the multifaceted nature of cultural signs, as a way of trying to influence, and so change, stereotypical representations of the veil. Both seek to bring ideas more fully into compliance with reality, as if the two were distinct realms, even as they recognize their interdependence. For Farris, too, material interests and rhetorical expression are inextricably entwined; she emphasizes how the structures and ideologies of discrimination are at once productive of and deeply rooted in economic interests. Her reading of “femonationalism” as a symptom of neoliberal capitalism gives little hope that a quick or effective solution is possible for the crises at hand.

So we are left without certain answers, and that’s as it should be: The goal of these books is not prediction but critique. And in that regard, they are useful and important, providing needed insight and detail to deepen our understanding of how we got here—a necessary step for thinking about whether and how we might be able to move to a better place.


Identify the tools for business planning and decision making

In this step, experience and effectiveness of the judgement principles come into play. What is the aim? Be careful when extrapolating or projecting figures to avoid magnifying initial mistakes or wrong assumptions.

Brainstorm and analyse the different choices For this step, brainstorming to list down all the ideas is the best option. Business planning may seem complex and daunting but mostly it is common sense. Decision-making mistakes There are a few common mistakes people make during the decision-making process that could result in a poor choice.

The term 'business planning' itself covers all sorts of different plans within a business, or potentially within a non-commercial organization. SWOT stands for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, which is exactly what this planning tool assesses.

Grand visions need solid foundations. Does the problem have a deadline or a specific time-line? What are we actually aiming to achieve? For each opportunity, ask the teams to assess the overall potential and overall challenge of each option, using the criteria described in Worksheet 2.

The business entity could also be a proposed start-up, a new business development within an existing organization, a new joint-venture, or any new organizational or business project which aims to convert action into results. In addition, there can be dozens of factors involved and affected by the problem.

The sales may drop after a year or so of being on the market. Conclusion When it comes to making decisions, one should always weigh the positive and negative business consequences and should favour the positive outcomes. Business planning always starts with or revisits the basic aim or need to provide products or services to customers - also called a market or 'market-place'.

Encourage players to think wide and broad.

Decision Making Process

What are your projected selling costs and net contributions per service, product, sector? Cause-and-Effect diagram helps you to identify all possible causes of the problem and Pareto chart helps you to prioritize and identify the causes with highest effect.

The metrics presented in the report deliver the measurement system, which, alongside the framework, offer a standardised way to address a range of business questions about packaging sustainability, either within a company or between business partners. This means that most business plans are driven by marketing, since marketing is the function which addresses market opportunity and need, and how to fulfil it.

Identification of the purpose of the decision In this step, the problem is thoroughly analysed. An Agile Focus strategy clearly defines your primary focus, the opportunities that you will keep open for backup or future growth, and those that you put aside for now.

Advantages & Disadvantages of Financial Statement Analysis in Decision Making

Then, you can move on generating all possible solutions alternatives for the problem in hand. Terry Li, Manager Rancho Management Our public consultation services require easy-to-configure and user-friendly digital platforms, and our recent pilot of Ethelo in a community planning project was a successful collaboration.

Based on Market Patterns One disadvantage of using financial statements for decision making is that the data and figures are based on the market at that given time.Decision making under risk is presented in the context of decision analysis using different decision criteria for public and private decisions based on decision criteria, type, and quality of available information together with risk assessment.

Decision-making tools and techniques While the basic principles might be the same, there are dozens of different techniques and tools that can be used when trying to make a decision. This paper attempts an empirical examination of the practicality of strategic management accounting (SMA) adoption in banks in Nigeria, a developing country.

Reach smart, broadly supported decisions quickly, by harnessing the collective intelligence of diverse stakeholders. Embrace complexity, and avoid the risk and polarization of simplistic “for” and “against” decision-making. Quotes.

Problem Solving

Identify the tools for business planning and decision making
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